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I. ABSTRACT
New advances in technology have greatly improved the
monitoring and controlling of power networks, but these
advances leave the system open to cyber attacks. One com-
mon attack is known as a False Data Injection Attacks
(FDIAs), which poses serious threats to the operation and
control of power grids. Hence, recent literature has proposed
various detection and identification methods for FDIAs, but
few studies have focused on a solution that would prevent
such attacks from occurring. However, great strides have
been made using deep learning to detect attacks. Inspired by
these advancements, we have developed a new methodology
for not only identifying AC FDIAs but, more importantly,
for correction as well. Our methodology utilizes a Long-
Short Term Memory Denoising Autoencoder (LSTM-DAE)
to correct attacked-estimated states based on the attacked
measurements. The method was evaluated using the IEEE 30
system, and the experiments demonstrated that the proposed
method was successfully able to identify the corrupted states
and correct them with high accuracy.
II. INTRODUCTION
Power systems and power grid networks are critical compo-
nents in our modern-day electrical infrastructure [1]. As such,
ensuring both the physical and cyber security of these systems
is of utmost importance. The use of information technology
in power systems offers various benefits such as improved
monitoring and controlling capability as well as allowed for
the integration of renewable energy sources. But with these
advantages come new risks. In recent years, cyber threats have
been recognized as the most significant and dangerous threats
to our power systems as a result of the increased dependency
on information technology [2].
State estimation is an important power system application
used to estimate the state of power transmission networks
through a set of sensor measurements and network topology
information [3]. The state estimator collects data about sensor
measurements from the Supervisory Control and Data Ac-
quisition (SCADA) system, including information about bus
voltages, active and reactive power injection at each bus, and
power flow in branches [4]. It also removes all noise and error
[1], as well as estimates the state of the power network[3].
These estimations are then used by network operators to ensure
that the power grid is running in the desired states, allowing
them to take corrective control actions if needed, and plan for
any emergencies [3] [5].
One of the most serious types of attacks on state estimation
is a new one: False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs). These at-
tacks target the state estimation of the power grid by tampering
with the data that are transmitted through communication lines
[6] [7]. FDIAs occur when an attacker introduces incorrect
data or measurements into the system, which will reduce the
control the system’s operator has over the system, thus altering
the state of the system [4]. It poses serious threats to the
operations and control of power systems as it can evade the
existing bad data detection (BDD) systems [8]. In addition,
FDIAs can affect deregulated energy markets and result in
severe economic loses [1].
To address FDIAs, protection-based strategies, and
detection-based strategies for defending the power systems
have been proposed in the literature [4]. Multiple detection-
based methods have been proposed. The most advanced
methods use deep learning approaches such as Convolutional
Deep Belief Network (CDBN) in [9], Recurrent Neural
Network (RNN) in [4], Deep Neural Network (DNN) in [6],
and Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) and Long-Short
Term Memory (LSTM) in [10][8] to address the problem.
While substantial progress has been made in FDIAs detection,
the complexity of the problem continues to present challenges
to those in the power systems community. [1] uses a statistical
approach to address FDIAs, correcting measurements before
feeding them to the state estimator. One limitation of this
method is the challenge of being scalable as it involves a
complicated threshold scheme that would need to be applied
to each scenario to detect the attack. Nevertheless, the scarcity
of studies that have attempted to go a step further beyond
attack detection and correct the errors resulting from FDIAs
makes this field a promising one for future research [11].
Inspired by the significant success of deep learning (DL)
methods in detecting attacks, in this paper, we present a new
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methodology for AC FDIAs identification and correction using
DL to both identify and correct attacked measurements. With
this method, we introduce the LSTM Denoising Autoencoder
(LSTM-DAE) to reconstruct the signal such that it detects the
anomaly and can then return it to its normal state. The new
correction method was evaluated using the IEEE 30 system,
and the experiments showed that the proposed method was
successfully able to identify the corrupted states and correct
them with high accuracy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II provides an overview of the state estimation process used
in control centers and the false data injection attacks. Section
III introduces the methodology of attack identification and
correction using the LSTM-DAE. Section IV presents the case
study, while Section V shows the simulation results of the
case study with a brief discussion of the efficiency of the
method used. Conclusions and suggestions for future work
are presented in Section VI.
III. BRIEF SUMMARY OF STATE ESTIMATION AND FDIAS
A. State Estimation
State estimation is a power system application used to
estimate the state of power transmission networks through a
set of sensor measurements and network topology information
[3]. Network operators use the estimations of the current state
to ensure that the power grid is running in the desired states,
take corrective control actions, if needed, and plan for any
emergencies [3] [5].
There are two types of state estimation based on the power
flow models of the network, namely DC and AC state estima-
tions. A DC state estimation is a linear state estimation that is
considered as a simplified version of the more complex AC or
nonlinear state estimation. The major differences between DC
and AC state estimations are: 1) in the DC state estimation,
the solution is obtained in a closed form, while in the AC
state estimation, it is obtained through iteration; 2) DC state
estimation is based on active power flow analysis while the
AC state estimation is based on reactive power flow analysis;
and 3) in the DC state estimation, the only variables are the
voltage phase angles, however, in the AC state estimation both
the voltage phase angles and magnitudes are system variables
[12].
For DC state estimation, the relationship between the net-
work’s measurement and its state can be expressed by the
following equation [3]:
z = Hx+ e (1)
where z = (z1, z2, z3, ..., zm)T is the sensor measurements,
x = (x1, x2, ..., xn)
T is the true states of the system, H is the
Jacobian matrix where Hx is a vector of m linear functions
linking measurement to states, and e = (e1, e2, ..., em)T is the
random errors in the measurement.
Since the DC model is a linear estimation of the network
state, then the estimated system state xest can be expressed
as:
xest = (H
TWH)−1HTWz (2)
Where W is a diagonal matrix that consists of the measure-
ment weights. As for the AC state estimation, since the power
flows are nonlinearly dependent, the relationship between the
networks measurement and its state can be expressed by the
following equation [13]:
z = h(x) + e (3)
where h(x) is a function vector that establishes the rela-
tionships between measured values and state variables. Con-
sequently, the estimated state variables are determined from
the following optimization function:
minF (x) = (z − h(x))T .W.(z − h(x)) (4)
B. FDIAs
False data injection attacks can be defined as those in which
an attacker changes the sensor’s measurements, which in turn
changes the estimated value of the state variables without be-
ing flagged by the state estimator’s bad measurement detection
algorithms. FDIAs can be either random or targeted [3]. In
random attacks, the attacker injects arbitrary errors into the
estimates of state variables while in targeted attacks, specific
errors are injected into the estimates of specific state variables.
A more significant categorization, however, is based on the
extent of the knowledge that the attacker has about the network
prior to launching the attack. As such, FDIAs can be either
complete or incomplete.
As the name suggests, with complete FDIAs, the attacker
has complete knowledge of the power network’s topology and
transmission-line admittance values, allowing him or her to
design a false data injection attack vector [14]. This type
of attack is rare since the attacker is operating with limited
resources and restricted physical access to the power grid.
Incomplete attacks, the most common type, occurs when
the attacker does not possess complete knowledge about the
network’s parameters and design [15]. For more information
on complete and incomplete attacks see[16].
In this research, we deal with complete attacks, assuming
that the attacker has the full knowledge required to carry out
the attack. The attackers full knowledge makes detection of
the attack more difficult.
IV. THE PROPOSED LSTM-DAE METHOD
Autoencoder, in general, is a neural network that is trained
in order to learn a high-level representation of data by reducing
data dimensionality. This is accomplished by having two main
parts which are an encoder part h = f(x) and a decoder part r
= g(h). While vanilla Autoencoder is only useful to compress
and decompress data without losing useful information [17],
Denoising Autoencoders (DAE) [18], which is a special type
of Autoencoder, can also learn to remove the noise from the
corrupted input by recovering the original undistorted input.
The DAE showed better representation more than the other
Fig. 1: LSTM Denoising Autoencoder Architecture.
Fig. 2: The Proposed Identification and Correction scheme for
FDIAs.
Autoencoder types as the network learns a higher level of
representation that is relatively robust to noise.
In this research, we aim to correct data affected by FDIAs.
Inspired by the DAE and due to the sequential nature of the
data, we are proposing a special type of RNN Autoencoder,
namely, LSTM-DAE, to correct data after FDIA.
To do so, instead of feeding the original input x, we feed
a noisy corrupted version of it xˆ, which is, in our case,
the attacked states. Then, the loss function in that case is
L(x,g(f(xˆ))) as the reconstructed version of the original input
x′ is computed from the corrupted input xˆ.
LSTM, on the other hand, is a modified version of vanilla
RNN, called gated RNN, which takes advantage of the se-
quential information to estimate the output [19], while having
the ability to preserve long-term memory relations [20]. This
is done by having three different types of gates, which are
forget gate, input gate, and output gate. When they are
combined together, the LSTM can be trained without worrying
about losing information from the long-term memory or not
capturing all the available information from the short-term
memory. Adding all this together, the proposed model consists
of DAE stacking multiple layers of LSTM, where the input is
a corrupted version of the data (Attack), and the output is the
correct version of it (Normal).
The architecture is composed of three main parts, which are
the encoder and the decoder, with a bridge between them. The
first part consists of three parts, which are the input sample
along with two LSTM layers. The input sample is a matrix
whose dimensions are the timestep window w and the number
of states. The first LSTM layer of the encoder part consists of
128 units, and the Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) is used as the
activation function because it is the state-of-the-art activation
function that can capture complex relations between the input
and the output [21]. The second LSTM layer of the encoder
part consists of 64 units with also a ReLU activation function.
Following that, the bridge between the encoder and the
decoder is represented by a Repeat Vector layer to reshape
the output of the second LSTM layer in the encoder part so it
can be fed into the first LSTM layer in the decoder part. This
is achieved by repeating the output of the second LSTM layer
in the encoder a number of times equal to the window size,
which is 5 in this case.
For the decoder part, it starts with an LSTM layer with
128 units and a ReLU function as the activation function.
This is followed by a Dense layer, which is a normal Neural
Network, but it is wrapped in a Time Distributed layer to
apply the Dense layer to every temporal slice of the input of
the layer. Finally, the output of the Dense layer is the corrected
states after training. The flow of the architecture can be seen
in Figure 1.
Our system works by correcting the samples online, such
that the corrected sample is fed back to the states’ queue in
order to correct the next attacked state. Thus, the step window
w which represents the input of the model is divided into
normal samples (xt−n, ..., xt−3, xt−2, xt−1) and an attacked
sample (xˆt). To ensure that the model is immune to the noise
coming from the corrected sample, Additive White Gaussian
Noise (AWGN) is added to the states in the normal samples
while training. This will guarantee that our system can handle
the noise generated from the correction process.
Our system assumes a perfect FDIAs detection; thus, our
proposed model focuses on identification and correction. Our
system identifies the attacked states by processing the cor-
rected states from the proposed system. A direct comparison
is applied between the corrected and attacked states after
applying thresholds for theta and voltage to identify the
attacked states. If any state value exceeds these thresholds,
this indicates that state as an attacked state. The scheme of
the process is illustrated in Figure 2.
V. CASE STUDY
In this research, we validated our results on the IEEE-30 bus
system using real-world load data found on the Independent
Electricity System Operator (IESO) website[22]. Specifically,
we trained our system on the data from 2002 to 2007 and
tested it on the data from 2013 to 2015 to ensure that our
system is not load dependent.
For FDIAs construction, we implemented the same method-
ology described in [16]. To train and evaluate our system, w
timesteps samples were sequentially sampled from the normal
dataset, and the last sample in the window has been attacked
such that it is not detected by the state estimator. Thus, w − 1
samples are normal x, and the last sample is the attacked state
vector xˆ. Using this setup, 200,000 of w samples have been
constructed. We trained, evaluated, and tested our system with
a ratio of 60/20/20, respectively.
For our experiments, we found that the best window size
setting is 5. For the evaluation metric, we used the Root Mean
Square Error (RMSE) to calculate the difference between the
normal and the attacked values [23]. Other metrics were also
tested, such as Mean Absolute Error (MAE) and Mean Square
Error (MSE), but RMSE gave the most easily interpretable
results.
All the results and simulations were conducted on Nvidia
K-80 GPU along with 16 GB of RAM. The LSTM-DAE was
constructed using Keras, which is a top-level library built on
top of TensorFlow for a computational speed boost.
The results showed that our model is capable of capturing
the temporal-spatial behavior of the data. As shown in Figure
3 , the loss of both the training and validation sets was
monitored while training the model, and the results revealed
that the RMSE was gradually decreasing until it reached
less than 0.0013 on the validation data after 15 epochs. The
RMSE reported on the testing set was 0.001 based on the
best validation model. Then, to validate that the model was
capable of reconstructing any attacked state, a random sample
was taken from the test set and the normal, attacked, and the
corrected states values were measured. This is visualized in
Figure 4, as the attacked state number 42 was successfully
Fig. 3: Model Loss (RMSE)
Fig. 4: Reconstruction of a random sample for 5 random states
reconstructed with high accuracy. Moreover, the RMSE values
were calculated for all the 60 states to ensure once again that
the model was capable of reconstructing any attacked state.
The results in Figure 5 show that this was achieved as the
maximum RMSE was less than 0.0025, which is very low.
Finally, the difference between the actual states and the
corrected one was calculated for all the states and timesteps
in the test dataset. It was found that the maximum difference
is less than 0.004, and most of the differences are between 0
and 0.002. In order to visualize this, a histogram graph was
plotted in Figure 6.
Surprisingly, our model is capable of almost reconstructing
the attacked states to their normal values with a very low
reconstruction error rate. Based on the reconstruction high
accuracy, we were able to identify the source of the attack
with a simple threshold mechanism, which gave us 100 percent
identification accuracy. We believe that our model has enough
capacity to capture the behavior of the system in its steady-
state given a real-world load on unseen load data. These very
promising results have encouraged us to pursue research to
model the state estimation itself using our approach.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new FDIAs identification
and correction for AC state estimation. While some papers
Fig. 5: RMSE values for all states
Fig. 6: Histogram of the difference between actual and cor-
rected statse.
tackled the detection of FDIAs, little work has been done on
identifying and correcting these attacks. The proposed method
consists of an LSTM-DAE, which can capture the temporal-
spatial dependencies. We validated our model on the IEEE
30-bus system using real-world load data. The results showed
the model was able to identify the attacked states and correct
them with high accuracy.
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